Branch data Line data Source code
1 : : /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 : : /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 : : * All rights reserved.
4 : : *
5 : : * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 : : * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 : : * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 : : *
9 : : * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 : : * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 : : * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 : : * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 : : * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 : : * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 : : *
16 : : * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 : : * the code are not to be removed.
18 : : * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 : : * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 : : * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 : : * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 : : *
23 : : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 : : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 : : * are met:
26 : : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 : : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 : : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 : : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 : : * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 : : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 : : * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 : : * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 : : * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 : : * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 : : * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 : : * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 : : * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 : : * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 : : *
41 : : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 : : * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 : : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 : : * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 : : * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 : : * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 : : * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 : : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 : : * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 : : * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 : : * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 : : *
53 : : * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 : : * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 : : * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 : : * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 : : */
58 : : /* ====================================================================
59 : : * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 : : *
61 : : * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 : : * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 : : * are met:
64 : : *
65 : : * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 : : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 : : *
68 : : * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 : : * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 : : * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 : : * distribution.
72 : : *
73 : : * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 : : * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 : : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 : : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 : : *
78 : : * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 : : * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 : : * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 : : * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 : : *
83 : : * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 : : * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 : : * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 : : *
87 : : * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 : : * acknowledgment:
89 : : * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 : : * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 : : *
92 : : * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 : : * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 : : * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 : : * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 : : * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 : : * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 : : * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 : : * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 : : * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 : : * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 : : * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 : : * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 : : * ====================================================================
105 : : *
106 : : * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 : : * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 : : * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 : : *
110 : : */
111 : :
112 : : #include <stdio.h>
113 : : #include <limits.h>
114 : : #include <errno.h>
115 : : #define USE_SOCKETS
116 : : #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 : : #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 : : #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 : : #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 : :
121 : : #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 : : # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
123 : : #endif
124 : :
125 : : #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 : : !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 : : defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 : : defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 : : defined(__INTEL__) ) \
130 : : )
131 : : # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 : : # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
133 : : #endif
134 : :
135 : : static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 : : unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 : : static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
138 : :
139 : 111737 : int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
140 : : {
141 : : /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 : : * packet by another n bytes.
143 : : * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 : : * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 : : * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 : : * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
147 : : */
148 : : int i,len,left;
149 : 111737 : long align=0;
150 : : unsigned char *pkt;
151 : : SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
152 : :
153 [ + - ]: 111737 : if (n <= 0) return n;
154 : :
155 : 111737 : rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
156 [ - + ]: 111737 : if (rb->buf == NULL)
157 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
158 : : return -1;
159 : :
160 : 111737 : left = rb->left;
161 : : #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 : 111737 : align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 : 111737 : align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
164 : : #endif
165 : :
166 [ + + ]: 111737 : if (!extend)
167 : : {
168 : : /* start with empty packet ... */
169 [ + + ]: 63909 : if (left == 0)
170 : 56205 : rb->offset = align;
171 [ + + ]: 7704 : else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
172 : : {
173 : : /* check if next packet length is large
174 : : * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 : 400 : pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 [ - + ]: 400 : if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 [ # # ]: 0 : && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
178 : : {
179 : : /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 : : * and its length field is insane, we can
181 : : * only be led to wrong decision about
182 : : * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 : : * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 : : * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 : : * overrun can be triggered. */
186 : 0 : memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
187 : 0 : rb->offset = align;
188 : : }
189 : : }
190 : 63909 : s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 : 63909 : s->packet_length = 0;
192 : : /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
193 : : }
194 : :
195 : : /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 : : * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 : : * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
198 [ - + ]: 111737 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
199 : : {
200 [ # # ]: 0 : if (left > 0 && n > left)
201 : 0 : n = left;
202 : : }
203 : :
204 : : /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
205 [ + + ]: 111737 : if (left >= n)
206 : : {
207 : 400 : s->packet_length+=n;
208 : 400 : rb->left=left-n;
209 : 400 : rb->offset+=n;
210 : 400 : return(n);
211 : : }
212 : :
213 : : /* else we need to read more data */
214 : :
215 : 111337 : len = s->packet_length;
216 : 111337 : pkt = rb->buf+align;
217 : : /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
218 : : * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
219 : : * 'left' extra ones at the end */
220 [ + + ]: 111337 : if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
221 : : {
222 : 400 : memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
223 : 400 : s->packet = pkt;
224 : 400 : rb->offset = len + align;
225 : : }
226 : :
227 [ - + ]: 111337 : if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
228 : : {
229 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 : 0 : return -1;
231 : : }
232 : :
233 [ + - ]: 111337 : if (!s->read_ahead)
234 : : /* ignore max parameter */
235 : : max = n;
236 : : else
237 : : {
238 [ # # ]: 0 : if (max < n)
239 : 0 : max = n;
240 [ # # ]: 0 : if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 : 0 : max = rb->len - rb->offset;
242 : : }
243 : :
244 [ + + ]: 173116 : while (left < n)
245 : : {
246 : : /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
247 : : * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
248 : : * len+max if possible) */
249 : :
250 : 125598 : clear_sys_error();
251 [ + - ]: 125598 : if (s->rbio != NULL)
252 : : {
253 : 125598 : s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
254 : 125598 : i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
255 : : }
256 : : else
257 : : {
258 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
259 : 0 : i = -1;
260 : : }
261 : :
262 [ + + ]: 125598 : if (i <= 0)
263 : : {
264 : 63819 : rb->left = left;
265 [ - + ][ # # ]: 63819 : if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
266 : 0 : !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
267 [ # # ]: 0 : if (len+left == 0)
268 : 0 : ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
269 : 63819 : return(i);
270 : : }
271 : 61779 : left+=i;
272 : : /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
273 : : * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
274 : : * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
275 [ - + ]: 61779 : if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
276 : : {
277 [ # # ]: 0 : if (n > left)
278 : 61779 : n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
279 : : }
280 : : }
281 : :
282 : : /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
283 : 47518 : rb->offset += n;
284 : 47518 : rb->left = left - n;
285 : 47518 : s->packet_length += n;
286 : 47518 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
287 : 47518 : return(n);
288 : : }
289 : :
290 : : /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
291 : : * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
292 : : * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
293 : : * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
294 : : #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
295 : :
296 : : /* Call this to get a new input record.
297 : : * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
298 : : * or non-blocking IO.
299 : : * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
300 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
301 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
302 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
303 : : */
304 : : /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
305 : 86128 : static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
306 : : {
307 : : int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
308 : 86128 : int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
309 : : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
310 : : SSL_SESSION *sess;
311 : : unsigned char *p;
312 : : unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
313 : : short version;
314 : : unsigned mac_size;
315 : : size_t extra;
316 : 86128 : unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
317 : :
318 : 86128 : rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
319 : 86128 : sess=s->session;
320 : :
321 [ + - ]: 86128 : if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
322 : : extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
323 : : else
324 : 86128 : extra=0;
325 [ - + ][ # # ]: 86128 : if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
326 : : {
327 : : /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
328 : : * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
329 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 : 86128 : return -1;
331 : : }
332 : :
333 : : again:
334 : : /* check if we have the header */
335 [ + + ][ - + ]: 87778 : if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
336 : 23869 : (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
337 : : {
338 : 63909 : n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
339 [ + + ]: 63909 : if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
340 : 23959 : s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
341 : :
342 : 23959 : p=s->packet;
343 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (s->msg_callback)
344 : 0 : s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
345 : :
346 : : /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
347 : 23959 : rr->type= *(p++);
348 : 23959 : ssl_major= *(p++);
349 : 23959 : ssl_minor= *(p++);
350 : 23959 : version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
351 : 23959 : n2s(p,rr->length);
352 : : #if 0
353 : : fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
354 : : #endif
355 : :
356 : : /* Lets check version */
357 [ + + ]: 23959 : if (!s->first_packet)
358 : : {
359 [ - + ]: 22879 : if (version != s->version)
360 : : {
361 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
362 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
[ # # ]
363 : : /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
364 : 0 : s->version = (unsigned short)version;
365 : : al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
366 : : goto f_err;
367 : : }
368 : : }
369 : :
370 [ - + ]: 23959 : if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
371 : : {
372 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
373 : 0 : goto err;
374 : : }
375 : :
376 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
377 : : {
378 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
379 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
380 : 0 : goto f_err;
381 : : }
382 : :
383 : : /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
384 : : }
385 : :
386 : : /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
387 : :
388 [ + - ]: 47828 : if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
389 : : {
390 : : /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
391 : 47828 : i=rr->length;
392 : 47828 : n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
393 [ + + ]: 47828 : if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
394 : : /* now n == rr->length,
395 : : * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
396 : : }
397 : :
398 : 23959 : s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
399 : :
400 : : /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
401 : : * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
402 : : */
403 : 23959 : rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
404 : :
405 : : /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
406 : : * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
407 : : * need to be copied into rr->data by either
408 : : * the decryption or by the decompression
409 : : * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
410 : : * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
411 : :
412 : : /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
413 : : * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
414 : :
415 : : /* check is not needed I believe */
416 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
417 : : {
418 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
419 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
420 : 0 : goto f_err;
421 : : }
422 : :
423 : : /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
424 : 23959 : rr->data=rr->input;
425 : 23959 : rr->orig_len=rr->length;
426 : : /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
427 : : * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
428 : : */
429 [ + + ][ + + ]: 23959 : if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
430 : : {
431 : : unsigned char *mac;
432 : 12437 : mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
433 [ - + ]: 12437 : OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
434 [ - + ]: 12437 : if (rr->length < mac_size)
435 : : {
436 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
437 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
438 : 0 : goto f_err;
439 : : }
440 : 12437 : rr->length -= mac_size;
441 : 12437 : mac = rr->data + rr->length;
442 : 12437 : i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
443 [ + - ][ - + ]: 12437 : if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
444 : : {
445 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
446 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
447 : 0 : goto f_err;
448 : : }
449 : : }
450 : :
451 : 23959 : enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
452 : : /* enc_err is:
453 : : * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
454 : : * 1: if the padding is valid
455 : : * -1: if the padding is invalid */
456 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (enc_err == 0)
457 : : {
458 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
459 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
460 : 0 : goto f_err;
461 : : }
462 : :
463 : : #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
464 : : printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
465 : : { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
466 : : printf("\n");
467 : : #endif
468 : :
469 : : /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
470 [ + + ][ + + ]: 23959 : if ((sess != NULL) &&
471 [ + + ]: 14813 : (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
472 [ + + ]: 28658 : (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
473 : : {
474 : : /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
475 : 1408 : unsigned char *mac = NULL;
476 : : unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
477 : 1408 : mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
478 [ - + ]: 1408 : OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
479 : :
480 : : /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
481 : : * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
482 : : * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
483 : : * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
484 : : */
485 [ + - + + ]: 2816 : if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
486 : : /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
487 [ - + ]: 2596 : (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
488 : 1188 : rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
489 : : {
490 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
491 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
492 : 0 : goto f_err;
493 : : }
494 : :
495 [ + + ]: 1408 : if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
496 : : {
497 : : /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
498 : : * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
499 : : * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
500 : : * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
501 : : * */
502 : 1188 : mac = mac_tmp;
503 : 1188 : ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
504 : 1188 : rr->length -= mac_size;
505 : : }
506 : : else
507 : : {
508 : : /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
509 : : * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
510 : : * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
511 : 220 : rr->length -= mac_size;
512 : 220 : mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
513 : : }
514 : :
515 : 1408 : i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
516 [ + - ][ - + ]: 1408 : if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
517 : : enc_err = -1;
518 [ - + ]: 1408 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
519 : 1408 : enc_err = -1;
520 : : }
521 : :
522 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (enc_err < 0)
523 : : {
524 : : /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
525 : : * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
526 : : * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
527 : : * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
528 : : * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
529 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
530 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
531 : 0 : goto f_err;
532 : : }
533 : :
534 : : /* r->length is now just compressed */
535 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (s->expand != NULL)
536 : : {
537 [ # # ]: 0 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
538 : : {
539 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
540 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
541 : 0 : goto f_err;
542 : : }
543 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
544 : : {
545 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
546 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
547 : 0 : goto f_err;
548 : : }
549 : : }
550 : :
551 [ - + ]: 23959 : if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
552 : : {
553 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
554 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
555 : 0 : goto f_err;
556 : : }
557 : :
558 : 23959 : rr->off=0;
559 : : /* So at this point the following is true
560 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
561 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
562 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
563 : : * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
564 : : * after use :-).
565 : : */
566 : :
567 : : /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
568 : 23959 : s->packet_length=0;
569 : :
570 : : /* just read a 0 length packet */
571 [ + + ]: 23959 : if (rr->length == 0)
572 : : {
573 : 1650 : empty_record_count++;
574 [ + - ]: 1650 : if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
575 : : {
576 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
577 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
578 : 0 : goto f_err;
579 : : }
580 : : goto again;
581 : : }
582 : :
583 : : #if 0
584 : : fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
585 : : #endif
586 : :
587 : : return(1);
588 : :
589 : : f_err:
590 : 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
591 : : err:
592 : : return(ret);
593 : : }
594 : :
595 : 0 : int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
596 : : {
597 : : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
598 : : int i;
599 : : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
600 : :
601 : 0 : rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
602 : 0 : i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
603 : 0 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
604 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i < 0)
605 : : return(0);
606 : : else
607 : 0 : rr->length=i;
608 : 0 : rr->data=rr->comp;
609 : : #endif
610 : 0 : return(1);
611 : : }
612 : :
613 : 0 : int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
614 : : {
615 : : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
616 : : int i;
617 : : SSL3_RECORD *wr;
618 : :
619 : 0 : wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
620 : 0 : i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
621 : : SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
622 : 0 : wr->input,(int)wr->length);
623 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i < 0)
624 : : return(0);
625 : : else
626 : 0 : wr->length=i;
627 : :
628 : 0 : wr->input=wr->data;
629 : : #endif
630 : 0 : return(1);
631 : : }
632 : :
633 : : /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
634 : : * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
635 : : */
636 : 56190 : int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
637 : : {
638 : 56190 : const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
639 : : int tot;
640 : : unsigned int n,nw;
641 : : #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
642 : : unsigned int max_send_fragment;
643 : : #endif
644 : 56190 : SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
645 : : int i;
646 : 56190 : unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
647 : :
648 [ - + ]: 56190 : if (len < 0)
649 : : {
650 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
651 : 0 : return -1;
652 : : }
653 : :
654 : 56190 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
655 [ - + ]: 56190 : OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
656 : 56190 : tot=s->s3->wnum;
657 : 56190 : s->s3->wnum=0;
658 : :
659 [ + + ][ + + ]: 56190 : if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
660 : : {
661 : 34850 : i=s->handshake_func(s);
662 [ + + ]: 34850 : if (i < 0) return(i);
663 [ - + ]: 1795 : if (i == 0)
664 : : {
665 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
666 : 0 : return -1;
667 : : }
668 : : }
669 : :
670 : : /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
671 : : * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
672 : : * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
673 : : * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
674 : : * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
675 : : * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
676 : : * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
677 : : * will notice
678 : : */
679 [ - + ]: 23135 : if (len < tot)
680 : : {
681 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
682 : 0 : return(-1);
683 : : }
684 : :
685 : : /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
686 : : * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
687 [ + + ]: 23135 : if (wb->left != 0)
688 : : {
689 : 8998 : i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
690 [ + + ]: 8998 : if (i<=0)
691 : : {
692 : : /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
693 : 7095 : s->s3->wnum=tot;
694 : 7095 : return i;
695 : : }
696 : 1903 : tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
697 : : }
698 : :
699 : : #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
700 : : /*
701 : : * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
702 : : * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
703 : : * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
704 : : * compromise is considered worthy.
705 : : */
706 [ + + ][ + + ]: 16040 : if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
707 [ + - ]: 820 : u_len >= 4*(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
708 [ + - ][ - + ]: 820 : s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
709 [ # # # # ]: 0 : !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
710 : 0 : EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
711 : 0 : {
712 : : unsigned char aad[13];
713 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
714 : : int packlen;
715 : :
716 : : /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
717 [ # # ]: 0 : if ((max_send_fragment&0xfff) == 0)
718 : 0 : max_send_fragment -= 512;
719 : :
720 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
721 : : {
722 : 0 : ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
723 : :
724 : 0 : packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
725 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
726 : : max_send_fragment,NULL);
727 : :
728 [ # # ]: 0 : if (u_len >= 8*max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
729 : 0 : else packlen *= 4;
730 : :
731 : 0 : wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
732 : 0 : wb->len=packlen;
733 : : }
734 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (tot==len) /* done? */
735 : : {
736 : 0 : OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
737 : 0 : wb->buf = NULL;
738 : 0 : return tot;
739 : : }
740 : :
741 : 0 : n=(len-tot);
742 : : for (;;)
743 : : {
744 [ # # ]: 0 : if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
745 : : {
746 : 0 : OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
747 : 0 : wb->buf = NULL;
748 : 0 : break;
749 : : }
750 : :
751 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
752 : : {
753 : 0 : i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
754 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i <= 0)
755 : : {
756 : 0 : s->s3->wnum=tot;
757 : 0 : return i;
758 : : }
759 : : }
760 : :
761 [ # # ]: 0 : if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
762 : 0 : nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
763 : : else
764 : 0 : nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
765 : :
766 : 0 : memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
767 : 0 : aad[8]=type;
768 : 0 : aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
769 : 0 : aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
770 : 0 : aad[11]=0;
771 : 0 : aad[12]=0;
772 : 0 : mb_param.out = NULL;
773 : 0 : mb_param.inp = aad;
774 : 0 : mb_param.len = nw;
775 : :
776 : 0 : packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
777 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
778 : : sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
779 : :
780 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
781 : : {
782 : 0 : OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
783 : 0 : wb->buf = NULL;
784 : 0 : break;
785 : : }
786 : :
787 : 0 : mb_param.out = wb->buf;
788 : 0 : mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
789 : 0 : mb_param.len = nw;
790 : :
791 [ # # ]: 0 : if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
792 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
793 : : sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
794 : : return -1;
795 : :
796 : 0 : s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
797 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
798 : : {
799 : : int j=6;
800 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
801 : : }
802 : :
803 : 0 : wb->offset = 0;
804 : 0 : wb->left = packlen;
805 : :
806 : 0 : s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
807 : 0 : s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
808 : 0 : s->s3->wpend_type= type;
809 : 0 : s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
810 : :
811 : 0 : i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
812 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i<=0)
813 : : {
814 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i<0)
815 : : {
816 : 0 : OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
817 : 0 : wb->buf = NULL;
818 : : }
819 : 0 : s->s3->wnum=tot;
820 : 0 : return i;
821 : : }
822 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i==(int)n)
823 : : {
824 : 0 : OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
825 : 0 : wb->buf = NULL;
826 : 0 : return tot+i;
827 : : }
828 : 0 : n-=i;
829 : 0 : tot+=i;
830 : 0 : }
831 : : }
832 : : else
833 : : #endif
834 [ + + ]: 16040 : if (tot==len) /* done? */
835 : : {
836 [ - + ][ # # ]: 1903 : if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
837 : 0 : !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
838 : 0 : ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
839 : :
840 : 1903 : return tot;
841 : : }
842 : :
843 : :
844 : 14137 : n=(len-tot);
845 : : for (;;)
846 : : {
847 [ + + ]: 22109 : if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
848 : : nw=s->max_send_fragment;
849 : : else
850 : 14137 : nw=n;
851 : :
852 : 22109 : i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
853 [ + + ]: 22109 : if (i <= 0)
854 : : {
855 : : /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
856 : 1903 : s->s3->wnum=tot;
857 : 1903 : return i;
858 : : }
859 : :
860 [ + + ][ + - ]: 20206 : if ((i == (int)n) ||
861 [ - + ]: 7972 : (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
862 : 7972 : (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
863 : : {
864 : : /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
865 : : * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
866 : 12234 : s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
867 : :
868 [ + - ][ - + ]: 12234 : if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
[ # # ]
869 : 0 : !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
870 : 0 : ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
871 : :
872 : 12234 : return tot+i;
873 : : }
874 : :
875 : 7972 : n-=i;
876 : 7972 : tot+=i;
877 : 7972 : }
878 : : }
879 : :
880 : 25919 : static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
881 : : unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
882 : : {
883 : : unsigned char *p,*plen;
884 : 25919 : int i,mac_size,clear=0;
885 : 25919 : int prefix_len=0;
886 : : int eivlen;
887 : 25919 : long align=0;
888 : : SSL3_RECORD *wr;
889 : 25919 : SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
890 : : SSL_SESSION *sess;
891 : :
892 : :
893 : : /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
894 : : * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
895 [ - + ]: 25919 : if (wb->left != 0)
896 : 0 : return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
897 : :
898 : : /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
899 [ - + ]: 25919 : if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
900 : : {
901 : 0 : i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
902 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i <= 0)
903 : : return(i);
904 : : /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
905 : : }
906 : :
907 [ - + ]: 25919 : if (wb->buf == NULL)
908 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
909 : : return -1;
910 : :
911 [ + - ]: 25919 : if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
912 : : return 0;
913 : :
914 : 25919 : wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
915 : 25919 : sess=s->session;
916 : :
917 [ + - ][ + + ]: 25919 : if ( (sess == NULL) ||
918 [ + + ]: 16973 : (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
919 : 16973 : (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
920 : : {
921 : : #if 1
922 : 10332 : clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
923 : : #else
924 : : clear=1;
925 : : #endif
926 : 10332 : mac_size=0;
927 : : }
928 : : else
929 : : {
930 : 15587 : mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
931 [ + - ]: 15587 : if (mac_size < 0)
932 : : goto err;
933 : : }
934 : :
935 : : #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
936 : : if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
937 : : !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
938 : : EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
939 : : do {
940 : : unsigned char aad[13];
941 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
942 : : int packlen;
943 : :
944 : : memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
945 : : aad[8]=type;
946 : : aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
947 : : aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
948 : : aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
949 : : aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
950 : : packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
951 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
952 : : sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
953 : :
954 : : if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
955 : :
956 : : mb_param.out = wb->buf;
957 : : mb_param.inp = buf;
958 : : mb_param.len = len;
959 : : EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
960 : : EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
961 : : sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
962 : :
963 : : s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
964 : : if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
965 : : {
966 : : int j=6;
967 : : while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
968 : : }
969 : :
970 : : wb->offset=0;
971 : : wb->left = packlen;
972 : :
973 : : /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
974 : : s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
975 : : s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
976 : : s->s3->wpend_type=type;
977 : : s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
978 : :
979 : : /* we now just need to write the buffer */
980 : : return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
981 : : } while (0);
982 : : #endif
983 : :
984 : : /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
985 [ + + ][ + + ]: 25919 : if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
986 : : {
987 : : /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
988 : : * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
989 : :
990 [ + + ][ + + ]: 5921 : if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
991 : : {
992 : : /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
993 : : * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
994 : : * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
995 : : * together with the actual payload) */
996 : 1650 : prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
997 [ + - ]: 1650 : if (prefix_len <= 0)
998 : : goto err;
999 : :
1000 [ - + ]: 1650 : if (prefix_len >
1001 : : (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
1002 : : {
1003 : : /* insufficient space */
1004 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 : 0 : goto err;
1006 : : }
1007 : : }
1008 : :
1009 : 5921 : s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1010 : : }
1011 : :
1012 [ + + ]: 25919 : if (create_empty_fragment)
1013 : : {
1014 : : #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1015 : : /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1016 : : * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1017 : : * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1018 : : * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1019 : 1650 : align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1020 : 1650 : align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1021 : : #endif
1022 : 1650 : p = wb->buf + align;
1023 : 1650 : wb->offset = align;
1024 : : }
1025 [ + + ]: 24269 : else if (prefix_len)
1026 : : {
1027 : 1650 : p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1028 : : }
1029 : : else
1030 : : {
1031 : : #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1032 : 22619 : align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1033 : 22619 : align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1034 : : #endif
1035 : 22619 : p = wb->buf + align;
1036 : 22619 : wb->offset = align;
1037 : : }
1038 : :
1039 : : /* write the header */
1040 : :
1041 : 25919 : *(p++)=type&0xff;
1042 : 25919 : wr->type=type;
1043 : :
1044 : 25919 : *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1045 : : /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1046 : : * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1047 : : */
1048 [ + + ]: 25919 : if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1049 [ + - ]: 880 : && !s->renegotiate
1050 [ + - ][ - + ]: 880 : && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1051 : 0 : *(p++) = 0x1;
1052 : : else
1053 : 25919 : *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1054 : :
1055 : : /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1056 : 25919 : plen=p;
1057 : 25919 : p+=2;
1058 : : /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1059 [ + + ][ + + ]: 25919 : if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1060 : : {
1061 : 9988 : int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1062 [ + + ]: 9988 : if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1063 : : {
1064 : 9064 : eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1065 [ - + ]: 9064 : if (eivlen <= 1)
1066 : 0 : eivlen = 0;
1067 : : }
1068 : : /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1069 [ + + ]: 924 : else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1070 : : eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1071 : : else
1072 : 66 : eivlen = 0;
1073 : : }
1074 : : else
1075 : : eivlen = 0;
1076 : :
1077 : : /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1078 : 25919 : wr->data=p + eivlen;
1079 : 25919 : wr->length=(int)len;
1080 : 25919 : wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1081 : :
1082 : : /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1083 : : * wr->data */
1084 : :
1085 : : /* first we compress */
1086 [ - + ]: 25919 : if (s->compress != NULL)
1087 : : {
1088 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1089 : : {
1090 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1091 : 0 : goto err;
1092 : : }
1093 : : }
1094 : : else
1095 : : {
1096 : 25919 : memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1097 : 25919 : wr->input=wr->data;
1098 : : }
1099 : :
1100 : : /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1101 : : * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1102 : : * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1103 : :
1104 [ + + ][ + + ]: 25919 : if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1105 : : {
1106 [ + - ]: 1914 : if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1107 : : goto err;
1108 : 1914 : wr->length+=mac_size;
1109 : : }
1110 : :
1111 : 25919 : wr->input=p;
1112 : 25919 : wr->data=p;
1113 : :
1114 [ + + ]: 25919 : if (eivlen)
1115 : : {
1116 : : /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1117 : : goto err; */
1118 : 9922 : wr->length += eivlen;
1119 : : }
1120 : :
1121 : : /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1122 : 25919 : s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1123 : :
1124 [ + + ][ + + ]: 25919 : if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1125 : : {
1126 [ + - ]: 13673 : if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1127 : : goto err;
1128 : 13673 : wr->length+=mac_size;
1129 : : }
1130 : :
1131 : : /* record length after mac and block padding */
1132 : 25919 : s2n(wr->length,plen);
1133 : :
1134 [ - + ]: 25919 : if (s->msg_callback)
1135 : 0 : s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1136 : :
1137 : : /* we should now have
1138 : : * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1139 : : * wr->length long */
1140 : 25919 : wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1141 : 25919 : wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1142 : :
1143 [ + + ]: 25919 : if (create_empty_fragment)
1144 : : {
1145 : : /* we are in a recursive call;
1146 : : * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1147 : : */
1148 : 1650 : return wr->length;
1149 : : }
1150 : :
1151 : : /* now let's set up wb */
1152 : 24269 : wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1153 : :
1154 : : /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1155 : 24269 : s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1156 : 24269 : s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1157 : 24269 : s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1158 : 24269 : s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1159 : :
1160 : : /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1161 : 24269 : return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1162 : : err:
1163 : : return -1;
1164 : : }
1165 : :
1166 : : /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1167 : 33267 : int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1168 : : unsigned int len)
1169 : : {
1170 : : int i;
1171 : 33267 : SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1172 : :
1173 : : /* XXXX */
1174 [ + - ]: 33267 : if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1175 [ - + ][ # # ]: 33267 : || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1176 : 0 : !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1177 [ + - ]: 33267 : || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1178 : : {
1179 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1180 : 0 : return(-1);
1181 : : }
1182 : :
1183 : : for (;;)
1184 : : {
1185 : 40846 : clear_sys_error();
1186 [ + + ]: 40846 : if (s->wbio != NULL)
1187 : : {
1188 : 40116 : s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1189 : 40116 : i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1190 : 40116 : (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1191 : : (unsigned int)wb->left);
1192 : : }
1193 : : else
1194 : : {
1195 : 730 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1196 : 730 : i= -1;
1197 : : }
1198 [ + + ]: 40846 : if (i == wb->left)
1199 : : {
1200 : 22109 : wb->left=0;
1201 : 22109 : wb->offset+=i;
1202 : 22109 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1203 : 22109 : return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1204 : : }
1205 [ + + ]: 18737 : else if (i <= 0) {
1206 [ - + ]: 11158 : if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1207 : : s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1208 : : /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1209 : : point in using a datagram service */
1210 : 0 : wb->left = 0;
1211 : : }
1212 : 11158 : return(i);
1213 : : }
1214 : 7579 : wb->offset+=i;
1215 : 7579 : wb->left-=i;
1216 : 7579 : }
1217 : : }
1218 : :
1219 : : /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1220 : : * 'type' is one of the following:
1221 : : *
1222 : : * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1223 : : * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1224 : : * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1225 : : *
1226 : : * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1227 : : * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1228 : : *
1229 : : * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1230 : : * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1231 : : * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1232 : : * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1233 : : * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1234 : : * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1235 : : * Change cipher spec protocol
1236 : : * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1237 : : * Alert protocol
1238 : : * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1239 : : * Handshake protocol
1240 : : * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1241 : : * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1242 : : * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1243 : : * Application data protocol
1244 : : * none of our business
1245 : : */
1246 : 125254 : int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1247 : : {
1248 : : int al,i,j,ret;
1249 : : unsigned int n;
1250 : : SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1251 : 125254 : void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1252 : :
1253 [ + + ]: 125254 : if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1254 [ + - ]: 231 : if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1255 : : return(-1);
1256 : :
1257 [ + + ][ + - ]: 125254 : if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
[ - + ]
1258 : 125254 : (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1259 : : {
1260 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 : 0 : return -1;
1262 : : }
1263 : :
1264 [ + + ][ - + ]: 125254 : if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1265 : : /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1266 : : {
1267 : 0 : unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1268 : 0 : unsigned char *dst = buf;
1269 : : unsigned int k;
1270 : :
1271 : : /* peek == 0 */
1272 : 0 : n = 0;
1273 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1274 : : {
1275 : 0 : *dst++ = *src++;
1276 : 0 : len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1277 : 0 : n++;
1278 : : }
1279 : : /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1280 [ # # ]: 0 : for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1281 : 0 : s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1282 : 0 : return n;
1283 : : }
1284 : :
1285 : : /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1286 : :
1287 [ + + ][ + + ]: 125254 : if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1288 : : {
1289 : : /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1290 : 33321 : i=s->handshake_func(s);
1291 [ + + ]: 33321 : if (i < 0) return(i);
1292 [ + - ]: 92298 : if (i == 0)
1293 : : {
1294 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1295 : 0 : return(-1);
1296 : : }
1297 : : }
1298 : : start:
1299 : 94458 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1300 : :
1301 : : /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1302 : : * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1303 : : * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1304 : : * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1305 : 94458 : rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1306 : :
1307 : : /* get new packet if necessary */
1308 [ + + ][ + + ]: 94458 : if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1309 : : {
1310 : 86128 : ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1311 [ + + ]: 86128 : if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1312 : : }
1313 : :
1314 : : /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1315 : :
1316 [ + + ]: 30639 : if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1317 : : * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1318 [ - + ]: 4430 : && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1319 : : {
1320 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1321 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1322 : 0 : goto f_err;
1323 : : }
1324 : :
1325 : : /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1326 : : * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1327 [ - + ]: 30639 : if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1328 : : {
1329 : 0 : rr->length=0;
1330 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1331 : 0 : return(0);
1332 : : }
1333 : :
1334 : :
1335 [ + + ]: 30639 : if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1336 : : {
1337 : : /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1338 : : * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1339 [ + + ][ - + ]: 28479 : if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
[ # # ]
1340 : 0 : (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1341 : : {
1342 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1343 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1344 : 0 : goto f_err;
1345 : : }
1346 : :
1347 [ + - ]: 28479 : if (len <= 0) return(len);
1348 : :
1349 [ + + ]: 28479 : if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1350 : : n = rr->length;
1351 : : else
1352 : 18257 : n = (unsigned int)len;
1353 : :
1354 : 28479 : memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1355 [ + - ]: 28479 : if (!peek)
1356 : : {
1357 : 28479 : rr->length-=n;
1358 : 28479 : rr->off+=n;
1359 [ + + ]: 28479 : if (rr->length == 0)
1360 : : {
1361 : 20149 : s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1362 : 20149 : rr->off=0;
1363 [ - + ][ # # ]: 20149 : if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1364 : 0 : ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1365 : : }
1366 : : }
1367 : 28479 : return(n);
1368 : : }
1369 : :
1370 : :
1371 : : /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1372 : : * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1373 : :
1374 : : /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1375 : : * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1376 : : */
1377 : : {
1378 : 2160 : unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1379 : 2160 : unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1380 : 2160 : unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1381 : :
1382 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1383 : : {
1384 : 0 : dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1385 : 0 : dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1386 : 0 : dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1387 : : }
1388 [ - + ]: 2160 : else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1389 : : {
1390 : 0 : dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1391 : 0 : dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1392 : 0 : dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1393 : : }
1394 : : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 [ - + ]: 2160 : else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1396 : : {
1397 : 0 : tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1398 : :
1399 : : /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1400 : 0 : rr->length = 0;
1401 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1402 : 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1403 : 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1404 : 0 : return(-1);
1405 : : }
1406 : : #endif
1407 : :
1408 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1409 : : {
1410 : 0 : n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1411 [ # # ]: 0 : if (rr->length < n)
1412 : 0 : n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1413 : :
1414 : : /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1415 [ # # ]: 0 : while (n-- > 0)
1416 : : {
1417 : 0 : dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1418 : 0 : rr->length--;
1419 : : }
1420 : :
1421 [ # # ]: 0 : if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1422 : : goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1423 : : }
1424 : : }
1425 : :
1426 : : /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1427 : : * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1428 : : * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1429 : :
1430 : : /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1431 [ + + ][ - + ]: 2160 : if ((!s->server) &&
1432 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1433 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1434 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1435 : : {
1436 : 0 : s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1437 : :
1438 [ # # ]: 0 : if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1439 : 0 : (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1440 : : (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1441 : : {
1442 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1443 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1444 : 0 : goto f_err;
1445 : : }
1446 : :
1447 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1448 : 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1449 : :
1450 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1451 [ # # ]: 0 : !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1452 : 0 : !s->s3->renegotiate)
1453 : : {
1454 : 0 : ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1455 [ # # ]: 0 : if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1456 : : {
1457 : 0 : i=s->handshake_func(s);
1458 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i < 0) return(i);
1459 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i == 0)
1460 : : {
1461 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1462 : 0 : return(-1);
1463 : : }
1464 : :
1465 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1466 : : {
1467 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1468 : : {
1469 : : BIO *bio;
1470 : : /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1471 : : * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1472 : : * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1473 : : * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1474 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1475 : 0 : bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1476 : 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1477 : 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1478 : 0 : return(-1);
1479 : : }
1480 : : }
1481 : : }
1482 : : }
1483 : : /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1484 : : * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1485 : : goto start;
1486 : : }
1487 : : /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1488 : : * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1489 : : * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1490 : : */
1491 [ + + - + ]: 3240 : if (s->server &&
1492 [ # # ]: 1080 : SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1493 [ # # ]: 0 : !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1494 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1495 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1496 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1497 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1498 : 0 : !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1499 : :
1500 : : {
1501 : : /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1502 : 0 : rr->length = 0;
1503 : 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1504 : 2160 : goto start;
1505 : : }
1506 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1507 : : {
1508 : 0 : int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1509 : 0 : int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1510 : :
1511 : 0 : s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1512 : :
1513 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1514 : 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1515 : :
1516 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1517 : : cb=s->info_callback;
1518 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1519 : 0 : cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1520 : :
1521 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cb != NULL)
1522 : : {
1523 : 0 : j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1524 : 0 : cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1525 : : }
1526 : :
1527 [ # # ]: 0 : if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1528 : : {
1529 : 0 : s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1530 [ # # ]: 0 : if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1531 : : {
1532 : 0 : s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1533 : 0 : return(0);
1534 : : }
1535 : : /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1536 : : * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1537 : : * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1538 : : * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1539 : : * expects it to succeed.
1540 : : *
1541 : : * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1542 : : * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1543 : : */
1544 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1545 : : {
1546 : 0 : al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1547 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1548 : 0 : goto f_err;
1549 : : }
1550 : : #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1551 : : else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1552 : : return(0);
1553 : : #endif
1554 : : }
1555 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1556 : : {
1557 : : char tmp[16];
1558 : :
1559 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1560 : 0 : s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1561 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1562 : 0 : BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1563 : 0 : ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1564 : 0 : s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1565 : 0 : SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1566 : : return(0);
1567 : : }
1568 : : else
1569 : : {
1570 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1571 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1572 : 0 : goto f_err;
1573 : : }
1574 : :
1575 : : goto start;
1576 : : }
1577 : :
1578 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1579 : : {
1580 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1581 : 0 : rr->length=0;
1582 : 0 : return(0);
1583 : : }
1584 : :
1585 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1586 : : {
1587 : : /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1588 : : * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1589 [ + - ][ + - ]: 2160 : if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
[ - + ]
1590 : 2160 : (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1591 : : {
1592 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1593 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1594 : 0 : goto f_err;
1595 : : }
1596 : :
1597 : : /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1598 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1599 : : {
1600 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1601 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1602 : 0 : goto f_err;
1603 : : }
1604 : :
1605 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1606 : : {
1607 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1608 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1609 : 0 : goto f_err;
1610 : : }
1611 : :
1612 : 2160 : s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1613 : :
1614 : 2160 : rr->length=0;
1615 : :
1616 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (s->msg_callback)
1617 : 0 : s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1618 : :
1619 : 2160 : s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1620 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1621 : : goto err;
1622 : : else
1623 : : goto start;
1624 : : }
1625 : :
1626 : : /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1627 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1628 : : {
1629 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1630 : 0 : !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1631 : : {
1632 : : #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1633 : : * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1634 : : * protocol violations): */
1635 : : s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1636 : : ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1637 : : :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1638 : : #else
1639 [ # # ]: 0 : s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1640 : : #endif
1641 : 0 : s->renegotiate=1;
1642 : 0 : s->new_session=1;
1643 : : }
1644 : 0 : i=s->handshake_func(s);
1645 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i < 0) return(i);
1646 [ # # ]: 0 : if (i == 0)
1647 : : {
1648 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1649 : 0 : return(-1);
1650 : : }
1651 : :
1652 [ # # ]: 0 : if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1653 : : {
1654 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1655 : : {
1656 : : BIO *bio;
1657 : : /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1658 : : * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1659 : : * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1660 : : * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1661 : 0 : s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1662 : 0 : bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1663 : 0 : BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1664 : 0 : BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1665 : 0 : return(-1);
1666 : : }
1667 : : }
1668 : : goto start;
1669 : : }
1670 : :
1671 [ # # # ]: 0 : switch (rr->type)
1672 : : {
1673 : : default:
1674 : : #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1675 : : /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1676 : : * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1677 : : */
1678 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1679 : : {
1680 : 0 : rr->length = 0;
1681 : 0 : goto start;
1682 : : }
1683 : : #endif
1684 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1685 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1686 : 0 : goto f_err;
1687 : : case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1688 : : case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1689 : : case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1690 : : /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1691 : : * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1692 : : * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1693 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1694 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 : 0 : goto f_err;
1696 : : case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1697 : : /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1698 : : * but have application data. If the library was
1699 : : * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1700 : : * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1701 : : * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1702 : : * we will indulge it.
1703 : : */
1704 [ # # ][ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1705 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1706 : : ((
1707 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1708 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1709 : : (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1710 [ # # ]: 0 : ) || (
1711 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1712 [ # # ]: 0 : (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1713 : : (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1714 : : )
1715 : : ))
1716 : : {
1717 : 0 : s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1718 : 0 : return(-1);
1719 : : }
1720 : : else
1721 : : {
1722 : 0 : al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1723 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1724 : 0 : goto f_err;
1725 : : }
1726 : : }
1727 : : /* not reached */
1728 : :
1729 : : f_err:
1730 : 0 : ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1731 : : err:
1732 : : return(-1);
1733 : : }
1734 : :
1735 : 2160 : int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1736 : : {
1737 : : int i;
1738 : : const char *sender;
1739 : : int slen;
1740 : :
1741 [ + + ]: 2160 : if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1742 : : i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1743 : : else
1744 : 1080 : i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1745 : :
1746 [ + + ]: 2160 : if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1747 : : {
1748 [ + - ][ - + ]: 1080 : if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1749 : : {
1750 : : /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1751 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1752 : 0 : return (0);
1753 : : }
1754 : :
1755 : 1080 : s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1756 [ + - ]: 1080 : if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1757 : : }
1758 : :
1759 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1760 : : return(0);
1761 : :
1762 : : /* we have to record the message digest at
1763 : : * this point so we can get it before we read
1764 : : * the finished message */
1765 [ + + ]: 2160 : if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1766 : : {
1767 : 1080 : sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1768 : 1080 : slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1769 : : }
1770 : : else
1771 : : {
1772 : 1080 : sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1773 : 1080 : slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1774 : : }
1775 : :
1776 : 2160 : i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1777 : 2160 : sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1778 [ - + ]: 2160 : if (i == 0)
1779 : : {
1780 : 0 : SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1781 : 0 : return 0;
1782 : : }
1783 : 2160 : s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1784 : :
1785 : 2160 : return(1);
1786 : : }
1787 : :
1788 : 2160 : int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1789 : : {
1790 : : /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1791 : 2160 : desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1792 [ + + ][ - + ]: 2160 : if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1793 : 0 : desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1794 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (desc < 0) return -1;
1795 : : /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1796 [ - + ][ # # ]: 2160 : if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1797 : 0 : SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1798 : :
1799 : 2160 : s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1800 : 2160 : s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1801 : 2160 : s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1802 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1803 : 2160 : return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1804 : : /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1805 : : * some time in the future */
1806 : : return -1;
1807 : : }
1808 : :
1809 : 2160 : int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1810 : : {
1811 : : int i,j;
1812 : 2160 : void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1813 : :
1814 : 2160 : s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1815 : 2160 : i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1816 [ + - ]: 2160 : if (i <= 0)
1817 : : {
1818 : 2160 : s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1819 : : }
1820 : : else
1821 : : {
1822 : : /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1823 : : * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1824 : : * we will not worry too much. */
1825 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1826 : 0 : (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1827 : :
1828 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->msg_callback)
1829 : 0 : s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1830 : :
1831 [ # # ]: 0 : if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1832 : : cb=s->info_callback;
1833 [ # # ]: 0 : else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1834 : 0 : cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1835 : :
1836 [ # # ]: 0 : if (cb != NULL)
1837 : : {
1838 : 0 : j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1839 : 0 : cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1840 : : }
1841 : : }
1842 : 2160 : return(i);
1843 : : }
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